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recover back money paid under an award 
which already has been spent by a claim-
ant for living expenses." /d. 
In Lake, the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals stated that they are not unmindful 
of the potential inequities presented by 
this appeal. In theory, no one would dis-
agree that funds which are disbursed with-
out ultimate legal vindication should be 
recoverable, however, after a lump sum 
award is made, it is difficult to justify tak-
ing back the money which has already been 
used for living expenses. This question 
poses a real dilemma and until the legis-
lature addresses these problems, these po-
tential inequities will surely occur again. 
- J. Russell Fentress IV 
Anderson v. Bimblich: RECOVERY 
OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS PRECLUDES 
RECOVERY IN TORT ACTION 
The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land in A nderson v. Bimblich, 67 Md. App. 
612,508 A.2d 1014 (1986), has held that 
an employee of a property management 
company under contract to the owners of 
an apartment building, injured while per-
forming custodial duties under a subcon-
tract with the building owners, and recov-
ers worker's compensation benefits, may 
not later pursue a tort action against the 
owners if they are deemed "principal con-
tractors," thus constituting a statutory em-
ployer within the meaning of the Worker's 
Compensation Act (the "Act"), Md. Ann. 
Code art. 10 1, § 62 (1985). 
On December 10, 1981, appellant Cyril 
Anderson suffered serious injuries result-
ing in the amputation of his right hand 
while operating a trash compactor in his 
capacity as custodian at the Barbazon 
Plaza Apartment complex. At the time 
of the accident Anderson was employed 
by the Smith-Braedon Property Co., 
("Smithy") pursuant to a contract with the 
appellees, Barbazon Plaza Associates (Bar-
bazon), a partnership of which the named 
defendant Bimblich was a member. Under 
the terms of the contract, Smithy was to 
provide property management, custodial, 
and maintenance services for the apart-
ment complex. Anderson subsequently 
filed for and received worker's compensa-
tion benefits for his injury. 
Unsatisfied, Anderson proceeded to file 
a "third party" suit against Barbazon, al-
leging negligence in the latter's mainte-
nance of a defective and dangerous trash 
compactor on the premises. Anderson's 
suit was filed pursuant to § 58 of the Work-
er's Compensation Act, which provides 
that an injured employee who previously 
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received benefits under the Act, could also 
elect to seek damages against a person 
other than the employer for negligence 
jointly caused by the employer and some 
other third party. See Md. Ann. Code, 
art. 101, § 58 (1985). 
In the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, Barbazon filed for, and the trial 
judge granted, a motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that Barbazon 
was Anderson's statutory employer within 
the meaning of§ 58 of the Act. Under the 
exclusive remedy provisions of§ 15 of the 
Act, an employee was barred from suing 
his employer to recover damages arising 
out of the employer's negligence if the em-
ployee previously elected to seek benefits 
under the Act. See Md. Ann. Code, art. 
101, § 15 (1985). Undeterred, Anderson 
appealed. 
Presented with a case of first impression, 
the court addressed the question of whether 
the appellees (Barbazon) were the statutory 
employer of Anderson, which if answered 
in the affirmative, would bar Anderson's 
recovery as a matter oflaw. 
The court first determined that the ex-
clusive remedy provisions of § 15 of the 
Act barred an employee who had previously 
elected to recover worker's compensation 
from later suing his employer for tort dam-
ages. The court next determined that not-
withstanding § 15, an employee could 
undertake to sue a person other than the 
employer to recover tort damages, so long 
as the party sued was not his statutory em-
ployer within the meaning of § 62 of the 
Act. 
To determine whether the appellees in 
the instant case were the statutory em-
ployers of Anderson, the court relied on 
the holding of the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland in Honaker v. W.C. and A.N. 
Miller Dev. Co., 278 Md. 453, 365 A.2d 
287 (1976). In considering whether the 
employer was a "principal contractor",. 
and thus the statutory employer of an em-
ployee injured while installing a slate roof, 
the Honaker court specified four elements 
that must be satisfied to bring an employer 
within the scope of§ 62. The four elements 
are: (1) a principal contractor; (2) who has 
contracted to perform work; (3) which is a 
part of his trade, business, or occupation; 
and (4) who has contracted with any other 
party as a subcontractor for the execution 
by or under the subcontractor of the whole 
or any part of such work. Anderson, 67 
Md. App. at 617,508 A.2d at 1016. 
The key determinant under Honaker was 
whether the contract between the principal 
contractor and the subcontractor arose out 
of the original contract between the parties, 
or resulted from a contract entered into by 
the principal contractor and a third party. 
As applied to the case at bar, if the subcon-
tract for custodial services arose out of the 
original contract between Barbazon and 
Smithy, Barbazon as "principal contractor" 
would be designated as the statutory em-
ployer of Anderson. However, the Honaker 
court cautioned that the preliminary find-
ing was subject to application of the "es-
sential or integral part" test. Under this 
test, a finding that the "subcontracted work 
is an 'essential or integral' part of the prin-
cipal contractor's business" is required. 
Miller Dev. Co. v. Honaker, 40 Md. App. 
185,388 A.2d 562 (1978), a/i'd, 285 Md: 
216,401 A.2d 1013 (1979). 
In applying the elements of the test set 
forth in Honaker to the facts of the case at 
bar, the court found that the first two ele-
ments were satisfied by evidence contained 
in the tenant-lease agreements which clearly 
designated Smithy as an agent/landlord of 
Barbazon. Additionally, the court found 
that a subcontract between Barbazon and 
the tenants to provide custodial services 
existed because of the landlord's promise, 
contained in the leases, to "deliver the 
premises and all areas in a clean, safe, and 
sanitary condition." Anderson, 67 Md. 
App. at 619,508 A.2d at 1017. 
The court further held that the third ele-
ment of Honaker was satisfied by the fact 
that the subcontract to provide custodial 
services for the benefit of the tenants was 
"an essential or integral" part ofBarbazon's 
business as apartment owners. Lastly, the 
court held that the fourth element was sat-
isfied because the maintenance subcontract 
was viewed as being part of the original 
property management contract between the 
appellees and Smithy, and not the result of 
a separate contract between Barbazon and 
some other third party, in this case the 
tenants themselves. 
In holding that apartment owners who 
contract with a property management 
company to provide custodial services by 
way of a subcontract are the "principal 
contractors," and thus the statutory em-
ployer of a custodian injured during the 
course of his employment, the court has 
expanded the meaning of statutory em-
ployer under § 62 of the Worker's Com-
pensation Act to encompass apartment 
building owners. The decision of the court 
thus extends the protections inherent in 
the Act to apartment building owners who 
subcontract for custodial services under 
a pre-existing property management con-
tract. Employees injured through the em-
ployer's negligence who have previously 
elected to seek benefits under § 15 of the 
Act, will continue to be precluded from 
bringing suit against a statutory employer 
as defined under § 62 of the Act. 
- Kenneth S. Savell 
